Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical Study

& National Record Clearing Project
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J.J. Prescott and Sonja Starr
Universities of Michigan and Chicago
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Google search: "Prescott Starr Expungement SSRN"

Email me: jprescott@umich.edu

Rapid Growth in Expungement Policies

Many Dozens of States

Adopted or expanded expungement laws over last few years

Automatic Expungement:

- Pennsylvania (2018)
 - Utah (2019)
 - California (2019)
 - New Jersey (2019)
 - Michigan (2020)

Eligibility Restrictions Vary...

WAITING PERIODS: range from 0 to 20 years, running from either sentence completion or conviction

CLASS OF CRIME: e.g., misdemeanors only

TYPE OF CRIME: e.g., nonviolent offenses

NUMBER OF CONVICTIONS: limits on total number applicant can have, as well as number allowed to be expunged


Motivation: Lots of Americans Have Criminal Records!

- FBI count (arrests—mainly felonies): 1/3 of adults
- Felony convictions: about 8% of adults; 33% of black men (Shannon et al. 2017)
- Misdemeanor arrests and convictions: ??? (more than felonies)

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Graphic Source: Center for American Progress

Collateral Legal Consequences of Convictions

- Occupational Licensing: especially security guards, health care, long term care, day care, schools/school services, firefighters, banks/financial services
- Federally subsidized housing
- Federal student loans and small business loans
- Some public benefits
- Parental rights
- Firearms
- Sex offender registration
- Deportation
- Public office

Many Unanswered Empirical Questions?

- How many people obtain expungements, and who tends to get them?
- What are the effects on employment and other socioeconomic outcomes?
- At what rate do people who obtain expungements subsequently reoffend?
- Does expungement affect recidivism rates?

Our Data

De-identified, Statewide Dataset Covering:

- All Michigan expungement ("set-aside") recipients through 2014
- Large comparison groups of people with similar records (including those legally eligible for set-asides) for 1999-2008 conviction cohorts

Data Sources (linked by state agency):

- Michigan State Police: full criminal histories through 2014
- Workforce Development Agency/Unemployment Insurance Agency: quarterly wage/employment data

Criminal Record Set-Asides in Michigan

Conviction removed from databases (divulging it is a misdemeanor)

For most purposes, can legally answer:
 NO conviction.



• Eliminates some collateral legal consequences

But record isn't completely expunged

The Michigan State Police retain the record and share it for:

- Sentencing of subsequent felonies
- Subsequent set-aside and pardon requests
- Occupational licensing by the judicial branch (i.e., the bar!)
- Background checks for law enforcement hiring
- Enforcement of rules governing sex offenders

M.C.L. 780.621: Eligibility Requirements (Pre-2011)

- One conviction on one count, ever
- 5 years after sentencing or prison release, whichever is later
- Exclusions: offenses carrying potential life terms, most sex offenses, driving offenses

Petition-Based System

- Applicant must apply and pay \$50 fee (plus some additional costs)
- Prosecutor notified and may oppose
- If applicable, victim notified and may appear
- Judge *may* grant set-aside if warranted by defendant's subsequent behavior and if "consistent with public welfare"

Key Findings

1. LOW UPTAKE: Very few of those eligible for set-asides receive them.

2. LOW RECIDIVISM: Set-aside recipients have extremely low subsequent rearrest and reconviction rates.

3. EMPLOYMENT/WAGE IMPROVEMENTS: Recipients see substantial increases in employment rates and wages.

"Uptake Rate" Analysis (Probability of Set-Aside Receipt If Eligible)

Our main analysis sample

- Those we can identify as becoming legally eligible for set-asides from 2004 through mid-2006
- Limited to those never incarcerated
- Limited to those with a specific list of set-aside-eligible statutory offenses
- Excludes people with out-of-state licenses

OVERALL 5-YEAR UPTAKE RATE

Balance Includes Non-Applicants, Unsuccessful Applicants, and those who wait more than 5 years

Best estimate: about 6.5%

Sources of uncertainty

- Need to impute some missing set-aside dates
- Incarcerated defendants excluded
- Eligibility coding misses out-ofstate offenses
- Some offenses excluded from sample

Table 1. Uptake Rates: Receipt of Set-Aside Within 5 Years of Eligibility

Version	5-Year Uptake	N
1. Main	6.5%	9,103
2. Accounting for Unknown Date Set-Asides: Lower Bound	5.7%	9,103
3. Accounting for Unknown Date Set-Asides: Upper Bound	6.7%	9,103
4. Add Incarcerated (< 1 Year)	5.4%	14,223

Why is Uptake so Low?

Insights from expert interviews

- Lack of information
- Administrative complexity/hassle
 - Fees
 - Fear and distrust
 - Lack of counsel
- Not everyone is highly motivated to remove conviction

Findings: Recidivism Within 5 Years of Set-Aside

Rearrested: 7.1% (2.6% violent, 2.7% felony)

Reconvicted: 4% (0.6% violent, 1% felony)

[Based on all set-aside recipients through 2008, except MI non-residents.]

Table 4. Re-Arrest and Reconviction Rates for Set-Aside Recipients

	2-Yr	2-Yr	5-Yr	5-Yr
	Arr.	Conv.	Arr.	Conv.
A. Full Sample				
Overall Arrest/Conviction Rates	3.4%	1.8%	7.1%	4.2%
Violent Arrest/Conviction Rates	1.0%	0.2%	2.6%	0.6%
Felony Arrest/Conviction Rates	1.2%	0.3%	2.7%	1.0%
B. Subsamples (Overall Rate Unless Specified)				
Set-Aside <6 Years from Conv./Release	3.8%	2.1%	8.1%	4.9%
Set-Aside 10-11 Years from Conv./Release	2.6%	1.6%	6.1%	3.4%
Set-Aside Conviction Was Felony	4.0%	1.9%	8.1%	4.6%
Set-Aside Conviction Was Misdemeanor	3.1%	1.8%	6.4%	3.8%
Incarcerated for Set-Aside Offense	3.2%	1.7%	6.7%	3.9%
Not Incarcerated for Set-Aside Offense	3.5%	1.8%	7.2%	4.3%
Set-Aside Offense Was Violent	4.4%	2.2%	8.4%	4.4%
Set-Aside Offense Was Violent: Violent Rate	1.6%	0.3%	4.0%	0.8%

Recidivism: Comparison to the General Population (Metric is Total Number of Arrests in Two Years)

SET-ASIDE RECIPIENTS: 4.7 Arrests/100 Persons

GENERAL ADULT POPULATION OF MICHIGAN: 6.6 Arrests/100 Persons

Two possible explanations for these low rates

(Our data can't disentangle these)

1. SET-ASIDE RECIPIENTS HAVE A LOW BASELINE CRIME RISK.

- Supported by research on desistance from crime
- People who have gone 5 years from their last conviction rarely reoffend
- Limited records + self-selected pool

2. SET-ASIDES REDUCE CRIME RISK.

- Supported by research on risk factors for recidivism, including unemployment and housing instability
- No research supports the expectation that set-asides would *increase* crime risk on balance.

Employment and Wage Analysis

We estimate within-person changes in employment and wage trends after receipt of a set-aside, with controls for Michigan economic conditions in the calendar quarter.

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\begin{split} Employed_{it} = \ \alpha + \gamma Elapsed_{it} + \delta Elapsed_{it} \times Post_{it} \\ + \theta Total Employment_t + \theta URate_t + \epsilon_{it}. \end{split}
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Sample: Employment and Wage Analysis

- Received set-aside on known date, Jan. 1998-May 2011
- Matched to UIA data during at least one quarter in 1997-2013
- No out-of-state driver's license
- For the time window used in the particular regression:
 - ➤ Whole window falls within the time range of our UIA data
 - ➤ Individual was between 18 and 64 years old

Key Findings: Employment and Wages

Within one year of receiving a set-aside conviction, on average:

- Employment probability goes up by factor of 1.13 (about 8pp)
- Probability of earning at least \$100/week goes up by factor of 1.23
- Quarterly wages go up by 23% (combines higher employment, more hours, higher pay)

These gains remain pretty stable after 1 year.

Figure 3a. Employment Rate (Any Wages in Quarter) Before and After Set-Aside




Figure 3b. Employment Rate (>\$100/week) Before and After Set-Aside





Figure 3c. Average Quarterly Wages Before and After Set-Aside



A. Employment Rate (Any Wage)

Elapsed × Post	0.0247*** (0.004)	0.0198*** (0.002)	0.00945*** (0.001)	0.00559*** (0.001)
Elapsed	-0.00610* (0.003)	-0.00649*** (0.001)	-0.00346*** (0.001)	-0.00247*** (0.000)
Net Gain	0.049	0.079	0.076	0.067
Proportional Net Gain	8.0%	12.8%	12.3%	10.9%
No. of Observations	57,596	125,451	226,525	301,500
Window (Quarters)	+/- 2	+/- 4	+/- 8	+/- 12

B. Employment Rate (>\$100/week)

Elapsed × Post	0.0367*** (0.003)	0.0308*** (0.002)	0.0149*** (0.001)	0.00838*** (0.001)
Elapsed	-0.0144*** (0.002)	-0.0124*** (0.001)	-0.00562*** (0.001)	-0.00320*** (0.000)
Net Gain	0.073	0.123	0.119	0.101
Proportional Net Gain	13.9%	23.1%	22.4%	18.9%
No. of Observations	71,899	125,451	226,525	301,089
Window (Quarters)	+/- 2	+/- 4	+/- 8	+/- 12

C. Wages

Elapsed × Post	314.5*** (36.77)	277.8*** (18.12)	154.2*** (10.38)	92.22*** (7.80)
Elapsed	-160.5*** (22.26)	-113.5*** (11.78)	-43.57*** (7.32)	-14.95* (6.10)
Net Gain	\$629.00	\$1,111.20	\$1,233.60	\$1,106.64
Proportional Net Gain	12.7%	22.5%	24.9%	22.2%
No. of Observations	71,899	125,451	226,525	301,089
Window (Quarters)	+/- 2	+/- 4	+/- 8	+/- 12

Causal Identification Concerns

People are somewhat likelier to apply for set-asides when they have recently lost a job/experienced wage decline.

Two related concerns:

- MOTIVATION: If set-aside applicants are also applying for jobs, the job search—not the set-aside—could drive subsequent gains.
- MEAN REGRESSION: Even without motivation effects, if these recent declines are essentially random, we would expect subsequent bounce-back on average.

Reasons to think a substantial part of the effect is causal

- (1) TIMING OF GAINS: The trend turnaround begins in the quarter the set-aside is *received*, not when it is applied for (~1-2 quarters earlier)
- (2) EFFECTS ON EARLY SET-ASIDE RECIPIENTS: Those who apply right after becoming eligible show extremely similar gains, despite:
 - No pre-period negative trend
 - Application timing seemingly driven by arbitrary 5-year rule
- (3) THEORY/OTHER RESEARCH PREDICTS IT. Ample evidence has shown that records impair employment prospects.

The Policy Upshot

THE GOOD NEWS: Expungement seems to have substantial benefits for recipients and raises no real public safety concern.

THE BAD NEWS: Hardly anyone (even among those eligible) actually receives expungement.

SO: Make expungements easier to obtain—especially procedurally. Strong case for automatic expungement (like PA, UT).

Waiting periods don't need to be longer than 5 years.

Further research is still needed

- Pilot interventions (or timing of them) could be randomized to study the effects, allowing strong causal inference
- Effects of automatic set-asides
- Effects with expanded eligibility requirements
- Effects on outcomes other than crime and employment

M.C.L. 780.621: Eligibility Requirements (Until April 2020)

- (1) Still minimal record, but you can now have:
- One conviction only
- OR two misdemeanors (can set aside both)
- OR one felony plus up to two misdemeanors (set aside only felony)
- (2) Only the conviction(s) you seek to set aside must be 5 years old
- (3) But the 5 year period now runs from completion of ALL sentence components
- (4) Slightly expanded excluded-offense list

Who does get set-asides?

Individual Characteristics

Black 30%, White 66%, Other 4% Male 61%

Employed when became eligible 66%

Employed quarter before set-aside 61%

Average quarterly wages ~\$5000

Who does get set-asides?

Case Characteristics

Felony 44%

Incarcerated 29%

Incarcerated more than 1 year 2%

Crime Type:

- Violent 15%
 - Drug 18%
- Property 53%
 - Other 18%

Figure 1. Years Elapsed Between Sentencing and Set-Aside





Figure 2. Uptake Rates by County



Significant Predictors of Increased Set-Aside Probability Among Those Eligible (from Table 3 Uptake Regressions)

- Female
- Younger age at conviction
- Felony
- Not a violent offense
- Not sentenced to incarceration
- Employed in preceding quarter [but see next one!]
- Recent wage (or employment) loss

5-Year Uptake			Set-Aside Received in a Given Quarter	
0.663**	0.654**	0.671**	0.693**	0.692**
			200000000000000000000000000000000000000	(0.052)
				0.948
				(0.083)
				0.990**
(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
2.552**	2.129**	2.211**	2.262**	2.446**
(0.284)	(0.262)	(0.227)	(0.194)	(0.219)
0.464**	0.545**	0.525**	0.554**	0.571**
(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.069)
1.243	1.487**	1.306*	1.400**	1.468**
(0.170)	(0.221)	(0.171)	(0.150)	(0.164)
1.272*	1.297+	1.331*	1.387**	1.449**
(0.153)	(0.175)	(0.150)	(0.128)	(0.140)
		0.553**	0.676**	0.672**
		(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)
			1.004	
			(0.007)	
			1.768**	
			(0.158)	
				2.268**
				(0.196)
\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
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			✓	✓
	(0.064) 0.989 (0.109) 0.988** (0.004) 2.552** (0.284) 0.464** (0.068) 1.243 (0.170) 1.272*	(0.064) (0.067) 0.989 0.825 (0.109) (0.098) 0.988** 0.986** (0.004) (0.004) 2.552** 2.129** (0.284) (0.262) 0.464** 0.545** (0.068) (0.085) 1.243 1.487** (0.170) (0.221) 1.272* 1.297* (0.153) (0.175)	(0.064) (0.067) (0.058) 0.989 0.825 0.846* (0.109) (0.098) (0.086) 0.988** 0.986** 0.986** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 2.552** 2.129** 2.211** (0.284) (0.262) (0.227) 0.464** 0.545** 0.525** (0.068) (0.085) (0.070) 1.243 1.487** 1.306* (0.170) (0.221) (0.171) 1.272* 1.297* 1.331* (0.153) (0.175) (0.150) 0.553** (0.057)	(0.064) (0.067) (0.058) (0.051) 0.989 0.825 0.846* 0.936 (0.109) (0.098) (0.086) (0.079) 0.988** 0.986** 0.988** (0.988** (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 2.552** 2.129** 2.211** 2.262** (0.284) (0.262) (0.227) (0.194) 0.464** 0.545** 0.525** 0.554** (0.068) (0.085) (0.070) (0.064) 1.243 1.487** 1.306* 1.400** (0.170) (0.221) (0.171) (0.150) 1.272* 1.297* 1.331* 1.387** (0.153) (0.175) (0.150) (0.128) 0.553** 0.676** (0.057) (0.057) 1.768** (0.158)